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GOLDEN PARACHUTE AGREEMENTS:
CUSHIONING EXECUTIVE BAILOUTS IN
THE WAKE OF A TENDER OFFER
In the event of a change in control of the Company, the
Chief Executive Officer is entitled to 'a severance payment from
the Company equal in amount to three times the sum of (i) the
executive's highest annual base salary in effect during the year
preceding severance plus (ii) the executive's highest annual bo-
nus award during the two years preceding severance, . . . and
the right to receive at his or her retirement a sum equal to the
actuarial equivalent of the additional retirement pension to
which the executive would have been entitled. . . had the exec-
utive accumulated three additional years of continued service
S. .. The agreements do not require that [the] executive miti-
gate the amount of payments by seeking other employment
Of the various methods of corporate acquisition1 only the
tender offer enables shareholders to effectuate a change of control
without management approval.2 Indeed, this mode of acquisition
t Brief for Defendant, Exhibit A, Allen v. Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp., No. 82-27756
(D. Ct. Harris County, Tex.) (Proxy Statement of Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp., Mar. 31,
1982, at 9) (formula to be applied in calculating benefits awardable under a golden para-
chute) [hereinafter cited as GRE Proxy Statement]. The GRE Proxy Statement defines a
change of control as the acquisition "of securities of the Company representing 35 % or more
of the combined voting power of the Company's then outstanding securities," or a change in
the majority of the board of directors during any 2-year period unless such change was
effected with the approval "of at least two-thirds of the directors then still in office who
were directors at the beginning of the period." Id.
I There are numerous methods of acquisition: purchase of the target's assets for cash,
notes, or the acquirer's stock; tender offers; and mergers or consolidations. 8 Z. CAvITcH,
BusINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING § 160.02, at 160-5 (1982). See generally W.
CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 842-920 (abr. 5th ed. 1980).
A statutory merger involves the combination of two corporations whereby one retains its
existence and subsumes the other. Upon compliance with certain statutory criteria, the sur-
viving corporation becomes the owner of the subsumed corporation's assets and liabilities. 2
B. Fox & E. Fox, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS § 23.02[1], at 23-11 (1982). In
contrast, an acquisition of assets involves a transfer of the seller's assets by contract rather
than by operation of law. Id. § 25.01[1], at 25-2. The acquisition need not be accomplished
in accordance with any specific criteria, and only the assets and liabilities specifically in-
cluded in the contract are transferred to the buyer. Id.
2 Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics
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has been regarded as "the principal mechanism by which manage-
ment can be forcibly unseated," 3 since an offer is made directly to
the shareholders to sell their shares at a premium price. Such a
takeover attempt is "hostile" when the target 5 corporation's man-
agement, anxious to retain control, engages in various defensive
tactics designed to make the target less attractive to the offeror,
or render the takeover legally impossible.7 A recent outgrowth of
the increase in hostile takeovers is a new form of defensive tac-
tic-the golden parachute."
Golden parachute agreements are designed specifically to avert
the consequences of a successful shareholder decision to change
control of a corporation by preserving the status or dignity of an
executive's position.9 The contract is triggered by a change in cor-
in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 819, 845-47 (1981). The board of directors is gener-
ally given the exclusive power to determine whether an acquisition is in the shareholders'
best interests. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1001(6) (West 1977). Hence, the issue usually
never reaches the shareholders. Moreover, the amount of time and expertise required prop-
erly to evaluate a proposed merger or sale of assets renders this task beyond the scope of the
average shareholder's abilities. Gilson, supra, at 846 & n.101. The shareholders, therefore,
do not have to consider a proposed acquisition unless the board of directors has approved it
by exercise of their "specialized skills." Id. at 846-47. This power of the board of directors
is not exercised, however, in the tender offer context. Id. at 847 & n.104.
Gilson, supra note 2, at 819.
" Tender offers frequently give shareholders the opportunity to receive a premium of
up to 72% above the market value of their stock. Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the
Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. REv. 403, 419 & n.118
(1980); see also 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEovERs AND FREEzEouTs § 1.7.5, at 89
(Supp. 1979). Additionally, the tender offer, unlike the merger or sale of assets, contem-
plates a personal contract between the target corporation's shareholders and the bidder.
Management is not required to investigate the terms or the merits of the offer. See Easter-
brook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender
Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1200 (1981).
5 The company whose shares are sought in the tender offer is described as the target or
subject company. A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING Vii
(1981).
8 There are two basic categories of defensive tactics: actions taken by a potentially de-
sirable target before an offer is made to the shareholders that are intended to make the
company less vulnerable, and actions taken in response to an actual takeover attempt. 1 M.
LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 4, § 6.1, at 263.
7 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1161-62; infra notes 28-32 and accompa-
nying text.
8 See WARD HOWELL INTERNATIONAL, INc., SURvEY OF EMPLOYMENT CoNTRAcTs AND
GOLDEN PARACHUTES AMONG THE FORTUNE 1000 1 (1982) (available through Ward Howell
International, Inc., 99 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10016) [hereinafter cited as
WARD HOWELL SURVEY].
9 See id. at 1-2; McLaughlin, The Myth of the Golden Parachute: What Every
Dealmaker Should Know, 17 MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONs 47, 47-48 (No. 2 1982); infra notes
37-52 and accompanying text.
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porate control,'0 and guarantees an executive payment of large
sums of money" and other benefits if he is fired or resigns because
of an alteration in his responsibilities.
Golden parachute agreements raise significant issues of fiduci-
ary duty and fairness to the corporation, 3 and implicate the theo-
retical basis of the business judgment rule.' 4 Questions as to
whether it is proper to compensate a fiduciary for a duty already
owed the corporation 15 and whether golden parachutes truly serve
a legitimate corporate purpose 6 have yet to be resolved. 17 Accord-
ingly, after examining the tender offer as a mechanism for chang-
ing corporate control, this Note will explore the characteristics of a
typical golden parachute clause. Thereafter, the various argu-
ments both for and against these provisions will be discussed. The
Note will conclude that golden parachute agreements are essen-
tially unfair to the corporation, and unjustifiably insulate manage-
ment from the market for corporate control to the detriment of the
shareholders.
THE TENDER OFFER AND TARGET MANAGEMENT'S LATEST
RESPONSE
The Tender Offer
A tender offer is an invitation or solicitation to shareholders of
the target company to tender their shares in return for a consider-
10 See WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 1, 3.
Id. at 7.
12 Cooper, The Spread of Golden Parachutes, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1982, at
65.
1' See infra notes 110-41 and accompanying text.
', See infra notes 78-109 and accompanying text.
See Cooper, supra note 12, at 68; infra note 61 and accompanying text. Employee
compensation is "not a waste or gift of assets as long as fair consideration is returned to the
corporation." Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1979). The determination of what
constitutes adequate consideration is within the discretion of the board of directors; a court
will defer to the board unless "no reasonable businessman could find that adequate consid-
eration had been supplied. . . ." Id.; see Fogelson v. American Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660,
662 (2d Cir. 1948); Nemser v. Aviation Corp., 47 F. Supp. 515, 517 (D. Del. 1942); Bush v.
Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 538, 568-75, 64 A.2d 581, 596-600 (1948).
16 See Lewin, Using 'Golden Parachutes,' N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1982, at D2, col. 1.
Opponents of golden parachutes have asserted that such contracts are "'a fraud upon the
corporation' and 'a waste of corporate assets.'" Cooper, supra note 12, at 67.
'7 Fleischer & Raymond, Whittaker-Brunswick Bid: Study in Takeover Defense, Legal
Times of Washington, June 28, 1982, at 27, col. 1; Lewin, supra note 16, at D2, col. 1.
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ation of cash or securities.18 When such an offer is made, target
management, pursuant to federal law, is required to publish within
10 business days a statement indicating its position on the pro-
posed offer. 19 This presents an inherent conflict of interest for tar-
get management. 0 As a fiduciary, management is obligated to act
in the shareholders' best interests,2' and therefore, after good-faith
consideration of the various contingencies, may be compelled to
support a proposed takeover.22 Concomitantly, management is
18 2 B. Fox & E. Fox, supra note 1, § 27.01, at 27-4. The consideration proffered in the
tender offer generally is cash or stock in the acquiring corporation. Id. This consideration is
usually greater than the fair market value of the securities sought. W. CARY & M. EISEN-
BERG, supra note 1, at 905. Unless a minimum of shares is tendered, the offeror is not obli-
gated to complete the purchase. Id.
The tender offer is a mechanism for obtaining control of a corporation whose manage-
ment either does not favor an acquisition and thus refuses to assent to the purchase of its
shares, or does not oppose but nonetheless is unwilling to support the acquisition. 2 B. Fox
& E. Fox, supra note 1, § 27.01, at 27-5; 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 4, §
1.1.1, at 3; see A. FLEISCHER, supra note 5, at 99. An acquiring corporation will opt for a
tender offer when it does not desire all of the targets assets but merely enough of its stock
to exercise control, 2 B. Fox & E. Fox, supra note 1, § 27.01, at 27-5, or when the acquirer is
acting as a "White Knight" in aid of a corporation seeking to avoid a hostile tender offer,
see 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 4, ,§ 1.1.1, at 3.
During the past 3 years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of mergers
and tender offers, particularly hostile tender offers. WARD HOWELL SURvEy, supra note 8, at
2. In 1981 alone there were more than 2300 recorded mergers. McLaughlin, supra note 9, at
47. See generally 2 B. Fox & E. Fox, supra note 1, § 27.02, at 27-14 (typical target charac-
terized by undervalued stock); Troubh, Characteristics of Target Companies, 32 Bus. LAW.
1301, 1301-03 (1977) (characteristics of a target company).
19 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1982). Management must issue one of four possible opinions
concerning a tender offer: recommending the tender, rejecting the offer, expressing neutral-
ity, or indicating its inability to take a position. Id. In addition, management must state its
reasons for the position it adopts. Id.
20 Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962); Gelfond & Sebastian,
supra note 4, at 436; 62 COLUm. L. REV. 1096, 1100-01 (1962).
21 Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712-13 (N.D. Ill.
1969); Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1940). The
court in Northwest Industries emphasized:
[M]anagement has the responsibility to oppose offers which, in its best judgment,
are detrimental to the company or its stockholders. In arriving at such a judg-
ment, management should be scrupulously fair in considering the merits of any
proposal submitted to its stockholders. The officers' and directors' informed opin-
ion should result from that strict impartiality which is required by their fiduciary
duties. After taking these steps, the company may then take any step not forbid-
den by law to counter the attempted capture.
301 F. Supp. at 712-13.
22 Relevant considerations concerning the merits of a tender offer include, inter alia,
whether the shareholders will receive a fair price for the tender of their shares, whether
proficient management will be obtained or retained, whether a synergistic relationship will
result from the takeover, public policy, and personal employment. Lipton, Takeover Bids in
1983]
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faced with a potential loss of control. 3 This conflict is even more
pronounced in poorly managed companies, which make attractive
targets for potential acquirers. Because these companies often pos-
sess conspicuously undervalued stock,24 potential acquirers recog-
nize that, by purchasing a majority of the undervalued shares and
installing efficient managers,25 the corporation's value will rise suf-
ficiently to offset the expense of the acquisition.26
In practice, management often reacts negatively to tender of-
fers, either opposing the transaction for personal reasons or con-
cluding that a takeover is not in the shareholders' best interests.27
In either event, management almost invariably engages in defen-
sive tactics intended to render the transaction illegal or undesir-
able.2 8  These tactics include initiating lawsuits against the of-
feror,29 issuing new shares to reduce the offeror's percentage of
the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 101 n.2 (1979) (quoting Bowers, It's a Raid!
Strategies for Avoiding Takeovers, 3 WHARTON MAG. 22, 28 (1979)). In Herald Co. v.
Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972), the court noted that management's "obligation and
duty is something more than the making of corporate profits. Its obligation is threefold: to
the stockholders, to the employees, and to the public." Id. at 1091 (footnote omitted). See
generally A. FLEISCHER, supra note 5, at 99-111 (issues considered when responding to a
tender offer); Small, General Perspectives, 32 Bus. LAW. 1349, 1349-52 (1977) ("[lthe setting
in which hostile tender offers are carried out tends to develop a war room atmosphere, and
it is necessary to ... insure that management develops as much objectivity as possible").
23 See W. CARY & M. EISENSBERG, supra note 1, at 905; WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra
note 8, at 2.
24 Gilson, supra note 2, at 838. Managerial inefficiency is a product of management's
inability to obtain all of the benefits of its work product. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
4, at 1170. Undervalued stock often results from excessive agency costs attributable to a lack
of managerial vigilance. Id. These excess costs may become a perpetual consequence of the
routine manner in which shareholders vote for managers without inquiry into their effi-
ciency. See id. at 1171.
"5 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1173. Prior to initiating a tender offer, a
prospective acquirer will investigate the target and compare its potential increased value, if
any, with its present value. When these two figures diverge significantly, the bidder will
commence a tender offer with a view toward installing new management. Id.; see Cohen,
Tender Offers and Takeover Bids, 23 Bus. LAW. 611, 613 (1968).
" Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1173. An acquirer presumes that the market
price of the stock accurately reflects target management's inefficiency, and that a new man-
agement and reduced agency costs will make the target more valuable subsequent to the
takeover. Id.; see Gilson, supra note 2, at 823. The value of the premium offered by the
bidder is based upon its evaluation of the potential worth of the target. Easterbrook & Fis-
chel, supra note 4, at 1173.
2' See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1161, 1175. Management often will hide
its self-interested motives in preventing the takeover behind the veneer of allegations that it
is seeking a better offer. Id. at 1175.
28 Id. at 1161-62.
2, Id. at 1161; see, e.g., In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 427 F. Supp. 1209,
1209-10 (N.D. Ill. 1977); see generally 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERG.ER, supra note 4, §§
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stock in the target,30 and purchasing a competitor of the offeror to
create antitrust complications.31 As can be seen, the objective of
these tactics is not to convince shareholders to retain their stock
interest, but rather, to "prevent the offer from being made, or if
made, consummated, . . . thereby ensur[ing] that shareholders
cannot make, from management's perspective, the 'wrong' deci-
sion. ' 32 Although state fiduciary standards33 and the anti-fraud
6.5.2.1 to 6.5.2.6, at 310-20 (possible causes of action at the disposal of a target company); A.
FLEISCHER, supra note 5, at 119-38 (various litigation tactics). A target company has stand-
ing to assert that an intended acquisition potentially implicates the antitrust laws, particu-
larly with respect to lessening actual competition. 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra
note 4, § 6.5.2.2, at 310-12; see, e.g., Boyertown Burial Casket Co. v. Amedco, Inc., 407 F.
Supp. 811, 814-17 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Similarly, management has standing to assert that
the offer ultimately may harm the target. 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 4, §
6.5.2.5, at 313-18.
The objective of the litigation commenced by the target company may be:
(a) to choose the most favorable forum, (b) to preclude the raider from suing to
seize the initiative, (c) to "chill" the arbitrage, (d) to delay or restrain the raider
while a White Knight is sought, [or] (e) to provide a psychological lift for target's
management.
Id. § 6.5, at 304 (citation omitted).
30 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1161; see A. FLEISCHER, supra note 5, at 148-
49. By issuing new shares, target management makes it more difficult for the acquirer to
obtain a sufficient amount of stock to gain control. Newly issued stock may be sold to enti-
ties friendly to the target to further diversify ownership of the corporation. Comment, Cor-
porate Defenses to Takeover Bids, 44 TUL. L. REv. 517, 525-26 (1970). Similarly, target
management may purchase the new shares itself, or repurchase outstanding shares at a
higher price than that offered by the bidder. This reduces the number of shares available to
potential acquirers, increases the price of the stock, and thereby makes the target less at-
tractive. Id. at 526.
3' 8 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 1, § 166A.04[3], at 166A-99 to 166A-100; A. FLEISCHER,
supra note 5, at 147; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1161-62. A target company
might purchase another company to expand its operations into similar geographic or prod-
uct markets as that of the bidder. A purchase by a target is not valid, however, if the sole
purpose of the transaction is to prevent the tender offer and the target does not have a
sufficient corporate purpose for such prevention. 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note
4, § 6.2.5, at 271-72; see Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1219-20 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 COR-
NELL L. REV. 901, 936-38 (1979).
Additional tactics include electing the board of directors to a staggered term, which
extends the time needed to attain control of the board, installing charter provisions requir-
ing supermajority vote, 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 4, § 6.2.2., at 265, and
selling a certain percentage of stock to a White Knight, id. § 6.2.7, at 273-74.
32 Gilson, supra note 2, at 819 (footnote omitted).
33 The specific standard with which a director must comply as a fiduciary is governed
by the applicable law in the state of incorporation. See Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d
1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 1969); Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696, 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 885 (1962). Each director is bound to exercise an individual loyalty to the corpora-
tion, and to avoid situations in which his personal interests might conflict with those of the
corporation. W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.04, at 8 (3d
1983]
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provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 193434 serve to limit
target management's defensive weaponry, the proliferation and ag-
gressiveness of defensive tactics persist.3 5 The latest entry into the
fray of hostile corporate takeovers is the golden parachute.3 6
The Golden Parachute
Golden parachutes are designed to minimize the ramifications
of a hostile tender offer by protecting the positions and responsi-
bilities of key executives.37 The rights enumerated in these con-
ed. 1978). See generally Fuller, Restrictions Imposed by the Directorship Status on the
Personal Business Activities of Directors, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 189, 190-211 (1941); Ramsey,
Director's Power to Compete with His Corporation, 18 IND. L.J. 293, 295-309 (1943). In New
York, for example, a director must act "in good faith and with that degree of care which an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances." N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); accord CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West
1977). The prudent person standard of care is applied in most jurisdictions. See 3A W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1035, at 28 (perm. ed. 1975).
3, See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1979). Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact. . . or to engage in any fraudulent, decep-
tive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or
invitation for tenders . . . ." Id.; cf. id. § 78j(b) (manipulative and deceptive devices in
security sale or purchase unlawful); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982) (omission, scheme or de-
ceptive device to defraud in sale or purchase of security).
" See, e.g., Barmash, Marietta's Autonomy Is Costly, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1983, at
D1, cols. 3-5, D4, cols. 5-6 (takeover battle between Bendix Corporation and Martin Mari-
etta Corporation).
'" See WARD HOWELL SuRvEY, supra note 8, at 1. For a discussion of golden parachutes
as defensive tactics, see infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
" Cooper, supra note 12, at 65; Morrison, Those Executive Bailout Deals, FORTUNE,
Dec. 13, 1982, at 82; WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 1, 6, 9. A survey released on
September 27, 1982 by Ward Howell International, Inc., an executive search firm, indicates
that 40% of the United States corporations on the Fortune 1,000 list provide employment
contracts for their top officers. WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 1. The survey indi-
cates a definite trend toward providing this protection from the consequences of tender of-
fers. Id. at 9. Generally, the larger the company or the more closely held its stock, the less
likely it is that employment contracts will be present. Id. at 3; see Table 1.
TABLE 1: PERCENTAGE OF CONTRACTS BY FORTUNE 1,000
RANK
Fortune rank Percentage of companies
with contracts
1 - 250 36.8%
251 - 500 39.4%
501 - 1,000 40.8%
Id. at 4 (Table 1). Of these contracts, 35.7% include a change of control clause creating a
golden parachute. Id. at 1. Golden parachutes are employed more frequently in the apparel,
furniture and chemicals fields. Id. at 4.
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tracts usually vest when an officer is dismissed following a takeover
or change of control," or when he leaves his position for "good
reason." 39 Some agreements, however, are triggered merely by the
accumulation by one entity of a certain percentage of the corpora-
tion's shares or the replacement of a specified number of
directors.4 °
Golden parachutes typically are negotiated shortly before or
during the intense flurry of activity that often accompanies publi-
cation of a tender offer.41 Recently, however, an increasing number
of corporations have given their top executives golden parachutes
despite the absence of any sign of an imminent takeover attempt.42
This precautionary outlook is fostered by the volatile nature of the
tender offer market and the resultant realization that few corpora-
tions are immune from takeover.43
While the types of benefits contained in a particular golden
parachute will be tailored to the individual executive involved,
some similarities can be observed in the contracts that have been
publicized. The most common recipients are the chief executive of-
ficer, the chairman of the board, the president and some senior
vice presidents.44 The contracts extend from 1 to 7 years in dura-
38 WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 3.
" "Good reason" has been defined as anything from demotion to the inability to per-
form duties in the way in which the executive was accustomed, including incompatability
between new and incumbent management. Cooper, supra note 12, at 66. Some contracts,
however, permit an executive to resign and obtain the benefits of his contract notwithstand-
ing that his duties and responsibilities have not been altered. Masters, Execs' 'Golden
Parachutes' Await First Court Challenges, Legal Times of Washington, Nov. 2, 1981, at 10,
cols. 2-3.
40 Some golden parachutes define change of control as the acquisition of as little as
15% of the target's outstanding shares. Morrison, supra note 37, at 85. Change of control
also may be defined in terms of a "delisting from a major stock exchange, a change in the
majority of the board of directors, or the replacement of a top executive." WARD HOWELL
SURVEY, supra note 8, at 3.
41 See Klein, A Golden Parachute Protects Executives, But Does It Hinder or Foster
Takeovers?, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1982, at 56, col. 1; WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 1.
The argument has been made that "[f]or a key employee to look after himself with regard to
uncertainties caused by tender offers should be as unassailable as corporate profits or divi-
dends." Herzel & Colling, Controversial 'Golden Parachutes' Offer Protection, Legal Times
of Washington, Aug. 21, 1982, at 10, col. 1.
42 Cooper, supra note 12, at 66; WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 2. But see N.Y.
Times, Apr. 26, 1983, at D5, col. 5. In response to public criticism regarding the propriety of
golden parachutes, Allied Corporation eliminated all such clauses from its executives' con-
tracts. Id.
" Cooper, supra note 12, at 65-66; Morrison, supra note 37, at 82; WARD HOWELL SUR-
VEY, supra note 8, at 2, 9.
41 WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 3; see Cooper, supra note 12, at 66-67.
1983]
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tion"4 and typically are given to between two and five executives."'
The benefits range from salary incentives to health, pension and
stock-purchase plans, 47 with over fifty percent of the contracts val-
ued at between one and five million dollars.48 Some contracts stip-
ulate a lump-sum payment while others call for periodic
payments.
49
The critical characteristic of a golden parachute is the change-
of-control provision,"0 which triggers the executive's entitlement to
the benefits provided in the agreement. 1 The significance of the
change-of-control clause makes it of paramount importance that
the contract articulate the executive's duties, responsibilities and
authority, and expressly provide that he will be entitled to resign
and receive the emoluments granted by the agreement when there
occurs an alteration in the enumerated duties and
responsibilities.52
In justification of these provisions, corporate proponents of
golden parachutes claim that they are necessary to attract and re-
tain quality executives to work for a company that is a potential
takeover target.5 3 This often involves luring "high caliber executive
45 See Cooper, supra note 12, at 66-67. As Table 2 indicates, 53% of the contracts pro-
vide for benefits in excess of 5 years, while 34% extend from 1 to 4 years.
TABLE 2: CONTRACT TERMS AND EXECUTIVES PROTECTED
Length of Number of
Contract Percentage Executives Protected Percentage
1-4 34.4% 1 29.5%
5+ 53.1% 2 - 5 36.9%
Not specified 12.4% 6+ 26.1%
Not specified 7.5%
WARD HOWELL SURvEY, supra note 8, at 7 (Table 4).
46 While these contracts are typically provided for between two and five executives,
some have included as many as 80. Cooper, supra note 12, at 66.
"I Id. at 66-67. Golden parachutes generally are structured to insure maintenance of
current salary, benefits, position and responsibilities. WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra note 8,
at 3. Specification of "job responsibilities, reporting lines and areas of authority" is fre-
quent, id., particularly in light of the common change-of-control provision permitting resig-
nation upon the alteration of any of the specified items. See id.
'a WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 7. Fifty-six percent of the publicized con-
tracts entail benefits worth between one and five million dollars, while approximately 27%
are worth less than one million dollars. Id. More than 14% of the contracts have potential
values greater than five million dollars. Id.
49 Id. at 2.
0 See id. at 1, 3.
See id. at 1, 3.
See id. at 3.
5S See id. at 1. Corporations generally face great difficulty in obtaining and retaining
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talent" from other corporations-a task not easily achieved with-
out providing job security guarantees. 4
THE GOLDEN PARACHUTE CONTROVERSY
It has been argued that golden parachutes are required to en-
sure that management is not disrupted by the departure of execu-
tives during a takeover battle.55 Such contracts are regarded as
providing managerial security, purportedly necessary to conduct
firm and objective opposition to a tender offer.5" While manage-
ment displacement may not follow a negotiated takeover, the usual
result of a bitter fight between an acquirer and a target is the firing
of many target executives after the acquisition is consummated. 57
"high caliber executive talent." Engel, Preface to COMPENSATING EXECUTIVE WORTH, at v
(R. Moore ed. 1968).
Without undertaking an in-depth analysis of executive compensation, it is possible to
compare a golden parachute clause with the more traditional methods of compensation.
Common forms of executive compensation include salary, stock options, bonuses, deferred
compensation and special pension provisions. F. STECKMEST, CORPORATE PERFORMANCE: THE
KEY TO PUBLIC TRUST 161-62 (1982). All compensation, however, must be proportionately
related to the executive's ability, effort exerted and success attained, as well as to the profit-
ability of the corporation. Gallin v. National City Bank of New York, 152 Misc. 679, 703,
273 N.Y.S. 87, 114 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1934).
When seeking quality management, particularly chief executives, the board of directors
considers compensation to be of secondary importance, since "the difference between merely
good and outstanding talent is off-scale in relation to compensation differences." F.
STECKMEST, supra, at 162. Thus, to obtain and retain qualified executives and to provide
motivation within the corporate structure, it has been argued that lucrative compensation
plans are in the corporation's and the shareholders' best interests. Id. at 163; Morrison,
supra note 37, at 83. Similarly, in the context of the volatile takeover atmosphere, golden
parachutes are intended to attract and retain superior executive talent. WARD HOWELL SUR-
VEY, supra note 8, at 1. There is, however, a unique characteristic that distinguishes golden
parachute clauses from all forms of executive compensation: while executive compensation
and incentives generally are conditioned upon performance, golden parachute agreements
are triggered merely by a change in control. See id. at 3.
" See Cooper, supra note 12, at 66; Fleischer & Raymond, supra note 17, at 26, col. 3.
"WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 9.
'e See Cooper, supra note 12, at 66; Klein, supra note 41, at 56, col. 1; infra notes 58-60
and accompanying text.
"' Cooper, supra note 12, at 65. Following a friendly takeover, the acquiring company
often will attempt to retain target management. The bitter disputes involved in a hostile
tender offer, however, engender such resentment between new and incumbent management
that it is impossible for them effectively to work together. R. Lamalie, Acquisition After-
math: What Happens to Executives After a Hostile Takeover? (available from Lamalie As-
sociates, Inc., 101 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10178). Thirty-two percent of the
1300 highest paid executives hired in the 18 months preceding August 31, 1982 were fired as
a result of a takeover or merger. Holding on in a Takeover, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 27, 1982, at
118. By the 3rd year subsequent to a takeover, fifty-two percent of the target company
executives either have been fired or have resigned. Perham, Surge in Executive Job Con-
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Golden parachutes are intended to provide top executives with as-
surance that they will not lose their employment, or at least the
benefits of that employment, as a result of a takeover.5 8  It is thus
argued that with this security executives can "coolly appraise" the
various implications of a tender offer without being distracted by
considerations of self-interest.5 " If management determines that
the takeover is not in the corporation's best interests, the golden
parachute beneficiary will be secure in presenting strong
opposition.0
In contrast, some question the propriety of granting executives
additional benefits to induce them to act in a manner in which
they already are legally bound, as corporate fiduciaries, to act."
tracts, DUN'S Bus. MONTHLY, Oct. 1981, at 87.
U Kleinfield, 'Golden Parachutes' for Ousted, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1982, at D17, cols. 1-
2. One corporate official stated: "[Golden parachute] agreements are designed to encourage
the employees to remain in the employ of the Corporation and to reinforce and encourage
their continued attention and dedication to their duties without distraction in the face of a
change in control." WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 9; see Fleischer & Raymond,
supra note 17, at 27, col. 2.
"' Cooper, supra note 12, at 66; Fleischer & Raymond, supra note 17, at 26, col. 3;
Herzel & Colling, supra note 41, at 10, cols. 1-2; Masters, supra note 39, at 10, col. 2. The
"principal argument" in favor of golden parachutes is that since target executives are, in
effect, "financially at the mercy of the would-be acquirer," the golden parachute clause will
enable them to evaluate the tender offer "strictly on its merits to the shareholder." Morri-
son, supra note 37, at 82.
" Cooper, supra note 12, at 66. The "insulation" provided by golden parachutes osten-
sibly permits an objective analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of a takeover, id.;
WARD HOWELL SURvEY, supra note 8, at 1, and fosters dedication to the corporation without
the additional pressure caused by a threat to job security, see Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1982, at
21, col. 2. Executives, "[b]y equipping themselves with golden parachutes-generous sever-
ance packages whose ripcords can be pulled when and if control of their company actually
changes hands-are able to avoid the fight-and-you'll-be-fired trap." Cooper, supra note 12,
at 65.
It has been argued, however, that there is no certainty that a golden parachute will
foster objectivity, since
[A]n increase in independence could make a target management either more or
less intransigent depending on a variety of strategic and psychological factors (in-
cluding the exact design of the golden parachute agreements) about which it is
very difficult to make general predictions. Intransigence is in itself difficult to
evaluate; it may lose the deal completely or obtain a better price from the original
offeror or from someone else.
Herzel & Colling, supra note 41, at 10, col. 2.
"i See Cooper, supra note 12, at 68; Morrison, supra note 37, at 83. Some statutes
empower the board of directors to manage "the business and affairs of the corporation."
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney
1963); F. KEMPIN & J. WIESEN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS 357 (2d ed.
1976); F. STECKMEST, supra note 53, at 185. In their capacity as managers, directors are
fiduciaries of the corporation and thus are bound to act solely in the interests of the corpo-
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Additionally, at a time when management should be concerned
with an impending takeover's impact on the corporation and the
shareholders, it appears that by devoting corporate time and re-
sources to ensure their personal security, executives are acting in
derogation of their common-law duties.6 2
A further criticism of the golden parachute is that it amounts
to an unnecessary squandering of corporate assets. 3 Certain oppo-
nents of the golden parachute base this criticism upon the notion
that rather than inducing executives to remain with a company
during a takeover battle, golden parachutes merely invite execu-
tives to resign,64 often without cause,e/ and collect the stipulated
benefits. Some corporate insiders, however, regard the golden para-
chute as wasteful, based upon their belief that, with or without a
golden parachute, management will battle a hostile takeover. They
note that the urge to preserve one's managerial position, with its
attendant aura of prestige and control, provides more incentive to
weather a takeover crisis than mere pecuniary guarantees.6 6 One
executive has stated that there is no "tendency... to 'give up'
during a takeover fight. This would be the least likely time for a
team member to leave-it would be so disloyal, he or she would
lose face."61
7
Finally, there is some debate concerning whether the golden
parachute is even a viable defensive tactic. While traditional de-
fensive tactics are designed to prevent tender offers from being
completed, s the golden parachute is aimed primarily at ameliorat-
ration and the shareholders. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 310-11 (1939); see Corporate
Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1599 (1978); Miller, The Fiduciary Duties of a
Corporate Director, 4 BALT. L. REv. 259, 260-61 (1975). See generally Fuller, supra note 33,
at 190-211 (appropriation by a director of a business opportunity is a breach of his fiduciary
duty); Ramsey, supra note 33, at 295-309 (possible fiduciary conflicts involved in a director's
purchasing property rights in which the corporation may be interested). Similarly, officers
are corporate fiduciaries and are bound to act solely for the benefit of the corporation. 3A
W. FLETCHER, supra note 33, § 850, at 175-76.
62 WARD HOWELL SuRvEY, supra note 8, at 9; Morrison, supra note 37, at 84-85.
13 See Cooper, supra note 12, at 66-67; Klein, supra note 41, at 56, col. 1.
U, Masters, supra note 39, at 10, col. 3. Some believe that "[golden parachutes] could
discourage an acquiring company, not because of the payments it would be required to
make, but because top executives would have a strong incentive to leave the company." Id.
65 See id. at 10, cols. 2-3; Morrison, supra note 37, at 85.
66 Morrison, supra note 37, at 86; see Cooper, supra note 12, at 66. Loss of power and
prestige may be more devastating to an executive than forfeiture of salary. Morrison, supra
note 37, at 86.
617 McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 48.
Is See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1161-62; supra notes 27-32 and accompa-
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ing the effects of a successful takeover on target management.69 It
is argued, moreover, that in a billion-dollar corporate takeover, the
amount involved in a golden parachute may constitute less than
one percent of the cost of the acquisition and therefore golden
parachutes will have little deterrent impact.7 0  Some commenta-
tors, however, assert that such clauses are effective defensive tac-
tics not only because a potential acquirer must consider the
amount of money involved in the parachute, but also because capa-
ble target management might leave in reliance on their rights
under the contract.71 Particularly when golden parachutes are em-
ployed with other tactics, they may "reinforce a negative attitude
and slow down a necessary acquisition. 72
ANALYZING THE GOLDEN PARACHUTE: THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT
RULE AND FAIRNESS
The business judgment rule dictates that directors and officers
will not be held liable for a mistake of law or fact that causes the
corporation harm if they acted in good-faith exercise of their busi-
ness judgment.7 The rule permits a presumption that directors
nying text; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1174-82 (consequences of man-
agement's defensive tactics); Lipton, supra note 22, at 123-24 (options available to target
management in fighting a tender offer).
" See Herzel & Colling, supra note 41, at 10, cols. 1, 3. Golden parachutes have been
described as "a market response to the growing risk of displacement by tender offers faced
by top executives of publicly held companies even when they are performing well." Id. at 10,
col. 3.
70 Morrison, supra note 37, at 86; see Cooper, supra note 12, at 68; Fleischer & Ray-
mond, supra note 17, at 26, col. 3; McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 48.
71 See, e.g., Masters, supra note 39, at 10, col. 3.
72 Cooper, supra note 12, at 68; see Morrison, supra note 37, at 85.
73 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 1, § 127.03[1], at 127-13 (1983); see, e.g., United Copper
Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917); Panter v. Marshall Field
& Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1982); Kaplan v.
Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971). Under federal law, golden parachute agree-
ments must be disclosed in the corporation's proxy statement, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101
(1982); this affords shareholders the opportunity to review and question the business judg-
ment of the board. Item 7 of section 240.14a-101 concerns remuneration of directors and
executive officers, and requires the filing of certain information required by Item 402 of
CFR section 229.402. Id. Section 229.402 calls for the furnishing of all information concern-
ing the compensation paid to "[e]ach of the five most highly compensated executive officers
or directors of the registrant as to whom total remuneration . . . would exceed $50,000,
naming each such person," id. § 299.402(a)(1), and information regarding the remuneration
of "[a]ll officers and directors of the registrant as a group, stating the number of persons in
the group without naming them," id. § 229.402(a)(2).
If a shareholder objects to any of the material disclosed he may institute a derivative
action, whereby a shareholder may protect his investment in the corporation in the event
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have acted in good faith if the action arguably was in the corpora-
tion's best interests.74 Courts will scrutinize a corporate transac-
tion, however, if it appears that a director was interested in the
outcome.7 5 If a conflict of interest is shown, the transaction will be
upheld if the director proves that he disclosed the material facts of
his interest to the board and that the contract was approved, in
good faith, by a majority of disinterested directors.76 Upon failing
to make this showing, the director must establish the fairness of
the transaction to the corporation. 7
The Business Judgment Rule
State statutes generally empower the board of directors to
manage "the business and affairs of the corporation."78 The board
is responsible for representing and furthering shareholder inter-
ests,79 and for approving all "major strategic business decisions."80
that management refuses to assert a corporate claim. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). The stockholder who maintains a derivative action assumes
the responsibilities of a fiduciary, acting as a "self-chosen representative and a volunteer
champion" of the entire class of shareholders. Id. at 549. There are several such suits pend-
ing with respect to golden parachutes. WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 8.
7' Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1982). To overcome the presumption, "the plaintiff must make a showing from
which a factfinder might infer that impermissible motives predominated in the making of
the decision in question." Id. at 294 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Johnson v. Trueblood, 629
F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980)). Provided a decision is honestly considered to be in the corpo-
ration's best interest, a director or officer wil not be held liable if the choice is subsequently
proven to have been made improvidently. 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 33, § 1039, at 37-8;
Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L.
REV. 600, 600 (1980); see Polin v. Conduction Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 809 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977).
75 Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Black Ranches,
Inc., 362 F.2d 19, 37-38 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Brando v. Black, 385 U.S. 990
(1966); Mardel Sec., Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp., 320 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1963);
Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 193 F.2d 666,
670-71 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Wyman v. Bowman, 127 F. 257, 273 (8th Cir. 1904); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 310(9)(3a) (West 1977).
71 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a)(2) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1)
(1974). A transaction involving an interested director is valid if the material facts are dis-
closed to the shareholders who, in good faith, ratify the measure. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 310(a)(1) (West 1977).
7 See Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 n.47 (2d Cir. 1980); Wilderman v.
Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974); CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a)(3) (West 1977);
Masters, supra note 39, at 10, col. 4; infra notes 111-41 and accompanying text.
7' See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. § 141(a) (1979); F.
KEMPIN & J. WIESEN, supra note 61, at 357; F. STEcKMEST, supra note 53, at 185.
70 See P. JACKSON, CORPORATE MANAGEMENT § 149(c), at 201 (1955); cf. 13 W. FLETcH-
ER, supra note 33, § 5736, at 29 (1980) ("[s]tockholders, even as a body, cannot make con-
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:516
While corporation statutes authorize the board to evaluate the im-
plications of mergers and sales of assets, thereby permitting direc-
tors to control such management displacement mechanisms, these
statutes are silent with respect to management participation in
tender offers."' Courts have held, however, that directors may ap-
prove defensive tactics to defeat a tender offer that they deem not
to be in the corporation's best interests. 2  It appears that the
courts, in applying a traditional business judgment analysis to
golden parachutes, will permit directors a similar prerogative upon
the assertion of an arguably legitimate corporate purpose. It is sug-
gested, however, that the premises underlying the business judg-
ment rule are not always applicable to the modern corporation,
and that the business judgment rule is thus an inappropriate stan-
dard by which to judge the validity of golden parachutes.
Modern corporate law prescribes that the board of directors is
the final arbiter of all major decisions involving the corporation."3
tracts for the corporation where the management is vested in the board of directors" (foot-
note omitted)); F. KEMPIN & J. WIESEN, supra note 61, at 295-308 (stockholders can only
influence corporate affairs by means of their voting rights exercised at a meeting).
80 F. STECKMEST, supra note 53, at 185; see W. KNEPPER, supra note 33, § 1.03, at 6.
81 See supra note 2.
82 See, e.g., Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712-13 (N.D.
Ill. 1969). In Northwest, B.F. Goodrich Co. and Gulf Oil Corp. engaged in a joint venture.
Id. at 708. In 1965, the companies considered having one purchase the other's interest. Id.
Before any terms were agreed upon, however, Northwest Industries announced that it would
commence a tender offer. Id. Within 1 day, Goodrich offered Gulf $35 million for Gulf's
interest, and on the following day, Goodrich's Board of Directors approved the transaction.
Id.
Northwest Industries requested a preliminary injunction, alleging that "the considera-
tion was grossly inflated in order to guarantee that a substantial block of stock would be
held by interests friendly to Goodrich's present management." Id. Denying the request, the
court discussed the duty of management with respect to a tender offer:
[Mianagement has the responsibility to oppose offers which, in its best judgment,
are detrimental to the company or its stockholders. In arriving at such a judg-
ment, management should be scrupulously fair in considering the merits of any
proposal submitted to its stockholders. The officers' and directors' informed opin-
ion should result from that strict impartiality which is required by their fiduciary
duties. After taking these steps, the company may then take any step not forbid-
den by law to counter the attempted capture.
Id. at 712-13. The court required an impartial evaluation by management, yet ignored its
observation that "whenever a tender offer is extended and the management of the
threatened company resists, the officers and directors may be accused of trying to preserve
their jobs at the expense of the corporation." Id. at 712.
'3 See, e.g., CAL. CoR'. CODE § 300(a) (West 1977). The power infrastructure of the
corporation is described as "pyramidal." W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 118.
Under this "received" model of the corporation, the stockholders comprise the base of the
pyramid and elect the next level: the board of directors. Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
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This decisionmaking power embraces transactions between officers
and the corporation, such as employment contracts.8 4 Courts gen-
erally will not question the board's judgment, since it is presumed
that the board acts as an impartial formulator of corporate pol-
icy. 85 Some commentators suggest, however, that the board is not
impartial, 8 that the modern board is dominated by the officers,
particularly the chief executive officer.87  It is submitted that an
examination of the actual corporate structure will demonstrate the
inconsistency inherent in presuming directorial impartiality in
transactions involving officers.
In determining that a director is disinterested in a transaction,
703(a) (McKinney 1963). The board is responsible for appointing the final level: the officers.
W. CARY & M. EISENBERO, supra note 1, at 118; see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.43
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983). The board may delegate certain managerial functions to the
officers "provided that the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed and all
corporate powers shall be exercised under the ultimate direction of the board." CAL. CORP.
CODE § 300(a) (West 1977); see F. STECKMEST, supra note 53, at 185; W. KNEPPER, supra
note 33, § 1.03, at 6.
The "received" model is based upon the theory that the board is the ultimate deci-
sionmaker with respect to selecting officers, determining policy and managing the general
business affairs of the corporation. Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in
the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. RaV. 375, 376
(1975). Under this model, therefore, officers are subordinate to the board. See id.
84 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 212(b)(4) (West 1977 & Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 122(5) (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.5(k) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 202(a)(10) (McKinney 1963); see also W. KNEPPER, supra note 33, § 6.06,
at 144-46. The salary paid to an executive under an employment contract must be reasona-
ble. See, e.g., Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Seideman, 267 F. Supp. 915, 919 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
85 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
8' See, e.g., J. BAKER, DIRECTORS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS-A PRELIMINARY STUDY 131-32
(1945); M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 108 (1971); Eisenberg, supra note 83, at
375-84.
17 In the typical large, publicly-held corporation, policymaking and management are
conducted by the officers, often to the exclusion of the board. Eisenberg, supra note 83, at
377. Indeed, the board rarely influences corporate affairs. Id. at 376-84; see Moscow, The
Independent Director, 28 Bus. LAW. 9, 9 (1972). Primarily as a result of time constraints,
information, composition, selection and tenure, the board is prevented from exercising, to
any meaningful extent, the role that it is given in the statutes. Eisenberg, supra note 83, at
378-83. See generally J. BAKER, supra note 86, at 11-27 (common constraints on directors).
Thus, there is a "drastic skew" between the received model of the corporation and the work-
ing model-"the virtually inevitable result" of the various constraints under which the
board must operate. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 173.
Most boards spend a minimal amount of time in preparation for board meetings, which
generally are held no more than 12 times per year. Id. at 378. In addition, most directors
lack a personal staff and must rely upon information gathered by the persons whom they
purportedly monitor. Id. at 380; see J. JURAN & J. LOUDEN, THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR 287-
89 (1966). Frequently, executives will deny the board access to certain information. Eisen-
berg, supra note 83, at 380.
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courts commonly place undue emphasis upon the absence of pecu-
niary benefit, often to the exclusion of other, equally compelling
factors."s One of these factors is the almost universal subordination
of directors to the wishes of the chief executive officer, to whom
they owe their election or appointment.89 In choosing his nominees,
the chief executive officer "take[s] into consideration whether the
candidate can be counted on not to rock the boat."9" This power
of selection encompasses both outside or "independent" directors,
as well as inside directors who serve the corporation in some other
capacity.91 These inside directors, who often supply legal, invest-
ment, or commercial services to the corporation, naturally are in-
terested in retaining the corporation's business.92 Additional ties to
88 See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1982). Courts tradi-
tionally have viewed the presence of a majority of outside or independent directors as dis-
positive of the issue of management dominance. See, e.g., Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153,
165, 160 A.2d 731, 738 (1960); Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 538,
583, 64 A.2d 581, 604 (1948). Conversely, the presence of interested directors has been held
sufficient to subject a transaction to a fairness analysis. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980). Criticizing such reliance upon the absence of pecuni-
ary interest in a transaction as determinative of director disinterest, Judge Cudahy stated
that "the very idea that, if we cannot trace with precision a mighty flow of dollars into the
pockets of each of the outside directors, these directors are necessarily disinterested arbiters
of the stockholders' destiny, is appallingly naive." Panter, 646 F.2d at 300 (Cudahy, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); see Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 375-84.
8 See W. KNEPPER, supra note 33, §§ 1.10-1.11, at 25-27; Eisenberg, supra note 83, at
381-83. According to Professor Eisenberg:
[Miost directors in most publicly held corporations are closely tied to the chief
executive-either economically, through an employment, professional, consulting,
or supplier relationship with the corporation, or psychologically, through friend-
ship, prior employment, or the fact that they have been selected and indoctrinated
by the chief executive and hold their seats at his pleasure.
Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 404 (footnotes omitted).
88 Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 382; see M. MACE, supra note 86, at 99.
81 Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 381-83. Whether a board member is an outside director
with no executorial duties or an inside director serving concomitantly as an officer, there
generally is some degree of dependence on the chief executive officer. Id. at 381-82. More-
over, it is increasingly common for the chief executive officer also to serve as chairman of
the board. W. KNEPPER, supra note 33, § 1.09, at 23.
82 See Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 382; Moscow, supra note 87, at 11. Twenty to
twenty-five percent of all outside directors in large corporations are lawyers or investment
bankers. Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 382. Thus, it is anomalous to consider the presence of
outside directors as dispositive on the issue of good faith:
Not only is the outside director selected by the control group that he presum-
ably will regulate, he is often the lawyer, commercial banker, or investment
banker for the corporation with obvious potential conflicts between his roles as a
supplier and as a director. The constituency of the outside director is a combina-
tion of his own interests, the interests of the control group that selected him, and
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the chief executive officer may derive from friendship.93
Due to the board's pecuniary and psychological dependence on
the chief executive officer, he is usually accorded undivided loyalty
regardless of the wisdom of his policies." Any diversion from the
expected conduct of rubberstamping all management proposals is
viewed as an act of disloyalty, likely to hasten a director's re-
moval. 5 A director appointed by the chief executive is "likely to
regard himself as serving at the latter's sufferance."9' At the very
least, most directors are interested in maintaining their own bene-
fits and prestige, and thus would hesitate to oppose the chief exec-
utive. 7 It is suggested that this corporate atmosphere creates a sit-
uation in which officers are capable of self dealing under the
protection of the business judgment rule.
Management's control over the board creates a potential con-
flict of interest in any corporate transaction involving an executive.
A transaction that relates to a present or potential tender offer is
no exception.9 s Since the tender offer is a method of management
displacement, a presumption should arise that executives are inter-
an undefined standard of the interests of shareholders.... Furthermore, even if
an outside director wants to exercise a meaningful judgment, he is limited by
other activities and business custom in the attention that he gives to corporation
business, as well as by the quality of information made available to him by man-
agement. Despite more time and attention, the selection process and absence of a
clearly defined constituency to represent would prevent the outside director from
fulfilling a significant function.
Moscow, supra note 87, at 11.
93 Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 382.
" The modern board virtually has become a "rubber-stamp" of management policy. Id.
at 377. Particularly in the case of inside directors, it is doubtful that they would be inclined
to disagree with policy decisions made by the executives prior to a board meeting. Id. at 381;
see W. KNEPPER, supra note 33, § 1.10, at 25.
" See Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 383.
Id. ("[p]erhaps even more important than the power of selection, investing the chief
executive with control over outside directors, is the fact that in life as in law the power to
hire implies the power to fire"). Directors who exercise a course of independence risk not
being renominated at the end of their term. Id. at 383 n.40; see Coffee, Beyond the Shut-
Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal
Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1233-34 (1977).
97 Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300-01 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1982); Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 4, at 436; Gilson, supra note 2, at
465.
95 The inherent conflict of interest posed by a hostile tender offer has been recognized
both judicially and academically. See, e.g., Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Kimball, 444 F. Supp.
292, 298 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712
(N.D. Ill. 1969); Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 4, at 420,436; Gilson, supra note 2, at 825-
26.
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ested in the success of their initiatives concerning the bid. 9 Ac-
cordingly, the directors, who undoubtedly will feel compelled to
comply with management's wishes, also must be considered inter-
ested.100 It is suggested, therefore, that these transactions are not
properly the subject of a deferential, business judgment analysis. 10'
The business judgment rule contemplates a free enterprise
system in which the courts will refrain from substituting their
judgment for that of the directors when complex business decisions
are at issue. 102 There is a difference, however, between corporate
activity in managing a business enterprise and that of using capital
and distributing profits and losses.' 03 According to one commenta-
tor, business management "involves corporate functioning in com-
petitive business affairs in which judicial interference may be un-
desirable,' ' 0 4 while financial distribution concerns "only the
corporation-shareholder relationship, in which the courts may
more justifiably intervene to insist on equitable behavior." 05 It is
submitted that this distinction should be drawn with respect to
golden parachutes. These contracts are neither the product of cor-
porate risk or initiative, nor the result of a complex business deci-
sion. 08 Moreover, golden parachutes do not involve considerations
in which "the director's expertise is likely to be greater than the
court's.' 107 Given management's domination of the board and the
99 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1175. To the extent that a target's
management is inefficient, their interest in preventing a takeover increases. Id.; cf. Gelfond
& Sebastian, supra note 4, at 436 (hostile tender offer "unavoidably involves forces tending
to shape decisions that are not necessarily for the benefit of all shareholders").
100 See Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 382-83; supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
101 See Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 4, at 436-37.
102 See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1982); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 181, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780
(1968); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920,
927 (1979); Stegemoeller, Derivative Actions and The Business Judgment Rule: Directoral
Power to Compel Dismissal, 69 ILL. B.J. 338, 339 (1981); Note, The Business Judgment
Rule and the Litigation Committee: The End of a Clear Trend in Corporate Law, 14 IND.
L. REV. 617, 617-20 (1981); Note, supra note 74, at 600-01; Editorial Note, 35 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 562, 565-66 (1967).
'1o Note, Protection for Shareholder Interests in Recapitalizations of Publicly Held
Corporations, 58 COLUm. L. REV. 1030, 1066 (1958) (footnote omitted).
104 Id.
105 Id.
10 Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1198-99 (determining whether to accept
or reject a tender offer does not involve a complex business decision).
107 Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 4, at 435. A decision whether to reject a tender
offer does not involve the type of business decision contemplated by the business judgment
rule. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1198-99. Similarly, a determination that a
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concomitant implication of conflicting interests, it is evident that
application of the business judgment rule is misplaced in the con-
text of golden parachutes."' 8 The propriety of the golden para-
chute, it is suggested, should be determined through the vehicle of
fairness.10 9
Fairness
Application of a fairness standard to golden parachutes is con-
sistent with the recent trend in corporate control cases to subject
management decisions to more objective scrutiny. For example, in
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,1" 0 the Delaware Supreme Court held that
when a freezeout merger"' is challenged as a fraudulent attempt to
eliminate minority shareholders, the merger must be entirely fair
to the minority, regardless of the existence of a valid business pur-
pose.112 The Weinberger court stated that "[t]he concept of fair-
particular employee should receive a golden parachute should not be accorded the judicial
deference implicit in a business judgment analysis. A court "need not gather costly informa-
tion nor induce managers to incur inefficiently large costs of decisionmaking to stave off
litigation." Id. at 1199.
108 See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 4, at 435-
37), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1982). In Panter, Judge Cudahy noted:
[T]he great danger becomes the channeling of the directors' expertise along the
lines of their personal advantage-sometimes at the expense of the corporation
and its stockholders. Here, courts have no rational choice but to subject chal-
lenged conduct of directors and questioned corporate transactions to their own
disinterested scrutiny. Of course, the self-protective bias of interested directors
may be entirely devoid of corrupt motivation, but it may nonetheless constitute a
serious threat to stockholder welfare.
646 F.2d at 300 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109 See infra notes 110-41 and accompanying text.
110 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). In Weinberger, a class action plaintiff challenged the va-
lidity of a cash-out merger. Id. at 703. The plaintiff asserted that the consideration paid to
UOP's minority shareholders "was grossly inadequate and that as a consequence the merger
was unfair and should be set aside." Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1335 (Del. Ch.
1981).
"I A freezeout occurs when a group of shareholders who own a controlling interest in
the corporation purchase the "entire equity interest" of other investors with cash, debt, or
preferred stock. 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 4, § 9.1, at 419; Areeda & Tur-
ner, Williamson on Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE L.J. 1337, 1357 (1978). Professors Areeda
and Turner regard freezeouts as coercive by definition, noting that "minority stockholders
are bound by majority rule to accept cash or debt in exchange for their common shares, even
though the price they receive may be less than the value they assign to those shares."
Areeda & Turner, supra, at 1357.
112 457 A.2d at 704. The Delaware Supreme Court held that an expanded appraisal
remedy and the broad discretion of the chancellor to redress a plaintiff in whatever fashion
the facts required rendered superfluous an inquiry into the business purpose of a transac-
1983l
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ness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price." ' Among
the factors deemed relevant by the court were the timing of the
transaction; "how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, [and]
disclosed to the directors"; and the means of obtaining the approv-
als of the directors and shareholders. 1" 4 Additional considerations
were of an economic nature.11 5 The clear import of Weinberger is
its indication of judicial willingness to inquire into the merits of a
transaction when a potential conflict of interest is present, regard-
less of an arguable business purpose.
Similarly, the law of parent-subsidiary mergers requires a de-
fendant to establish the entire fairness of a transaction. In Sterling
v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.," 6 the Supreme Court of Delaware
stated that "since [majority stockholders] stand on both sides of
the transaction, they bear the burden of establishing its entire fair-
ness, and it must pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts." 1 7
In determining whether a parent-subsidiary merger satisfies this
test, the court must consider all relevant factors." 8
A common thread connecting freezeout and parent-subsidiary
mergers is that both demand similar fiduciary obligations from the
management participants."" As the potential for self-dealing in
tion. Id.
113 Id. at 711; see Moore, The "Interested" Director or Officer Transaction, 4 DEL. J.
CoRP. L. 674, 676 (1979); Nathan & Shapiro, Legal Standard of Fairness of Merger Terms
Under Delaware Law, 2 DEL. J. CORP. L. 44, 46 (1977).
114 57 A.2d at 711. Generally, an evaluation of fairness involves the consideration of all
of the terms of the merger. See Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71,
72 (Del. 1950); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430-31 (Del. Ch.
1968); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148, 149 (Del. Ch. 1943);
accord Collins v. SEC, 532 F.2d 584, 589-90 (8th Cir. 1976).
115 See 457 A.2d at 711. All of the relevant factors were examined as a whole to ensure
that the transaction was entirely fair to the shareholders. Id.; see Singer v. Magnavox, 380
A.2d 969, 976 (Del. 1977); Bastian v. Bourns, 256 A.2d 680, 681 (Del. Ch. 1969); David J.
Greene & Co. v. Dimhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430 (Del. Ch. 1968); Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (1952); Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note
4, at 447-49.
116 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952).
27 Id. at 298, 93 A.2d at 110; see Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 90
A.2d 660, 663 (Del. 1952); Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 243-44, 2 A.2d 904, 908
(1938); see also 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 33, § 921, at 383-84 (a director on both sides of
a transaction must prove its inherent fairness to the corporation).
118 Sterling, 33 Del. Ch. at 305, 93 A.2d at 114 (quoting Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp.,
27 Del. Ch. 127, 134, 32 A.2d 148, 151 (1943)).
19 See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977); Sterling, 33 Del.
Ch. at 298, 93 A.2d at 109-10; Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 4, at 447; Moore, supra note
113, at 674-79.
GOLDEN PARACHUTE AGREEMENTS
these transactions is apparent, the courts properly subject them to
the strictest scrutiny.120 It is suggested that golden parachutes
should be evaluated similarly, since officers, by virtue of their dom-
inance over the board, stand on both sides of the negotiations.
Courts generally consider all relevant facts and circumstances
when examining the fairness of a corporate transaction. This stan-
dard, therefore, is of imprecise definition.1 21 The factors of fair
dealing and fair price, however, seem to be at the foundation of
any fairness analysis. 22
In considering fair dealing, the court must examine the rela-
tionships between the parties. 23 As fiduciaries, directors and of-
ficers must act solely to benefit the cestui; hence, they must forego
any personal advantage that may result from their positions.1 2  It
is thus suggested that compensating an executive following a take-
over, particularly one whose services the shareholders evidently did
not wish to retain, is inherently unfair to the shareholders.1 25
120 See, e.g., Sterling, 33 Del. Ch. at 298, 93 A.2d at 110. Situations amenable to self-
dealing are not properly the subject of a business judgment analysis. In the context of merg-
ers, when one corporation dominates the other corporation, "there is some element of or
potential for self-dealing in the transaction." Nathan & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 45.
When the parties making a transaction are on both sides of that transaction, "then the
presumption and deference to sound business judgment are no longer present. Intrinsic fair-
ness, tested by all relevant standards, is the criterion." David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill
Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968); cf. Carrad, The Corporate Opportunity Doc-
trine in Delaware: A Guide to Corporate Planning and Anticipatory Defensive Measures, 2
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 1-15 (1977) (directors, officers and controlling stockholders have both
affirmative and negative fiduciary obligations).
121 See Gefond & Sebastian, supra note 4, at 448.
,22 Moore, supra note 113, at 676.
12' Nathan & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 46.
124 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 489-90
(3d Cir. 1976); Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939); see 6 Z. CAvrrcH,
supra note 1, § 127.02[1], at 127-4; 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 33, § 850, at 175-76; W.
KNEPPER, supra note 33, § 1.04, at 8; Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 61, at
1599 (director should not derive a "personal profit or gain or other personal advantage" by
dealing in his corporate capacity with a third party); see also Fuller, supra note 33, at 190-
211 (discussing various conflicts of interest); Ramsey, supra note 33, at 295-309 (examining
the different areas where conflict of interest may occur).
With respect to the board, it has been stated that the primary purpose of the board of
directors "is the representation and safeguarding of the stockholders' interests." M. NICHOL-
SON, DUTIES AND LIABILrrIEs OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 111 (1972). Similarly,
officers are bound by a strict rule of honesty and fair dealing and must act solely in the
corporation's interests. W. FLETCHER, supra note 33, § 850, at 175-76. See generally J.
BISHOP, THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS-INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE
3.01-.07, at 3-2 to 3-24 (1981) (liability as a result of status or conduct).
129 It appears superfluous to sanction golden parachutes as contracts intended to permit
executives the financial security necessary to oppose a tender offer considered adverse to the
1983]
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Golden parachutes merely insulate management from the conse-
quences of a concerted shareholder decision.
Additi6nal considerations involved in fair dealing include the
manner of negotiation, how the transaction was presented to the
directors, and the degree of shareholder involvement in approving
the transaction. 12 6 Perhaps the most egregious aspect of golden
parachutes is that they often are negotiated without shareholder
approval 217 immediately before or after a tender offer has been ini-
tiated. 28 Additionally, while the board must authorize the con-
tract, to ignore management's participation in the instigation of
these contracts, and its dominance over the board,1 29 exhalts form
over substance.
shareholders' interests. The presumption that executives will oppose such a takeover more
vehemently is ill-founded, since, regardless of the golden parachute, managers do not want
to lose their company. The golden parachute could create a laissez-faire attitude in that
management is now assured that, even if the takeover occurs, it will nevertheless receive
compensation. See McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 48; Morrison, supra note 37, at 86.
Moreover, executive compensation and perquisites are directly structured for adapta-
tion to the threat of displacement. See F. STEcKMEsT, supra note 53, at 161-64. Once under
contract, there is "an implied duty that an employee act solely for the benefit of his em-
ployer in all matters within the scope of employment." Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner,
282 Md. 31, 38, 382 A.2d 564, 568 (1978). In light of the fiduciary duties of both directors
and officers, the market-structured compensation packages such parties receive, and their
contractual obligations, it is suggested that golden parachutes are merely a wasteful form of
self-enrichment. If a corporate maniger needs such a contract to foster personal objectivity,
it is submitted that he already is acting in derogation of his fiduciary duty.
I28 Moore, supra note 113, at 676; see Nathan & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 46-47.
127 See Kleinfield, supra note 58, at D1, col. 2. One recent development in the contro-
versy concerning shareholder approval of golden parachute provisions has been a proposal
by a special panel named by the Securities and Exchange Commission recommending that
such provisions be approved by the shareholders of a corporation. See Noble, S.E.C. Panel
Asks Curb On Golden Parachutes, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1983, at 33, col. 5.
128 See Lewin, supra note 16, at D2, col. 1.
128 See Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 376-84; supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text;
cf. Coffee, supra note 96, at 1132-47 (difficulties inherent in board control over decisiomak-
ing). In light of the dominance that executives routinely exercise over the board, it is sug-
gested that judicial examination of contracts involving corporate executives individually
should be subjected to a fairness analysis similar to that applied to contracts benefitting a
majority of the board.
In a takeover context, where conflicts of interest permeate both management and
directoral decisionmaking, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300 n.1 (7th Cir.
1981) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Gelfond & Sebastian,
supra note 4, at 436-37), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1982), the fairness test is an appropri-
ate standard. While director interest does not necessarily imply unfairness, and conflict of
interest may not be presumed, it is suggested that executive domination is a sufficient
ground to subject a golden parachute agreement, which is peculiarly related to hostile
tender offers, see WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 9, to a fairness analysis.
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The second factor in an examination of fairness is price.130
With respect to mergers, fair price is determined by examining
"assets, market value, earnings, and any other factors or elements
that are unique to a company, directly affecting the intrinsic or
inherent value of its stock."131 In the context of executive sever-
ance-pay agreements, fair price most likely would be determined
by an examination of the consideration given to and provided by
the beneficiaries of the golden parachute. It is submitted that such
an examination reveals an uneven distribution in favor of the
golden parachute beneficiary.
First, although it is conceded that hostile tender offers may
engender great tension and require considerable effort to com-
bat,13 2 a contract providing an executive with several million dol-
lars for less than 1 month of trauma does not appear to involve
adequate consideration on the part of the executive.133 Hence, the
minority shareholders, those that retain their shareholder status
130 Moore, supra note 113, at 676.
1S Id. With respect to mergers, fair value may be defined as "the price or price range at
which a rational willing buyer and a rational willing seller would exchange the stock or other
security in question in an arm's-length transaction, assuming that each had knowledge of all
the relevant facts. .. ." Nathan & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 48.
Evidently, the criterion of fair value is a constant in judicial evaluations of situations
wherein management has an opportunity to self-deal. Traditional compensation
must be in proportion to the executive's ability, services and time devoted to the
company, difficulties involved, responsibilities assumed, success achieved, amounts
under jurisdiction, corporation earnings, profits and prosperity, increase in volume
or quality of business or both, and all other relevant facts and circumstances; nor
should it be unfair to stockholders in unduly diminishing dividends properly
payable.
Gallin v. National City Bank of New York, 152 Misc. 679, 703, 273 N.Y.S. 87, 114 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1934) (citations omitted). By applying similar concepts to golden parachutes,
it will be demonstrated that they are inherently unfair to the shareholders.
I'l See Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAw. 1433, 1433-35
(1977).
It, See Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739-40 (7th Cir. 1979) (payments made without
"fair consideration" are gifts). A tender offer involves a very short period of time. The offer
must be kept open at least "twenty business days from the date such tender offer is first
published or sent or given to security holders," 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1982), and within
10 business days, target management must express its opinion on the offer's merits. Id. §
240.14e-2.
Regardless of the short period of time involved in a tender offer, executives owe a pre-
existing duty to the shareholders and therefore the binding quality of golden parachutes is
questionable. See DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 433, 117 N.E. 807, 808 (1917)
("where A is under a contract with B, a promise made by one to the other to induce per-
formance is void"); see also Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 37-38, 382 A.2d
564, 568 (1978); Williams v. Queen Fisheries, Inc., 2 Wash. App. 691, 694-95, 469 P.2d 583,
585-86 (1970).
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after a takeover, unnecessarily are forced to accept a loss of corpo-
rate assets."' Second, with respect to those who eventually will
tender their shares, there is a possibility that the offer will be ad-
justed downward in consideration of the golden parachute provi-
sion. 1 5 Third, the amount of money accorded executives through
such a provision often will exceed an executive's apparent worth to
the corporation. Indeed, since many target companies are those
with low stock values, and, presumably, poor management,13 6 a job
security provision, as magnanimous as a golden parachute, 3 7 seems
indelibly stamped with impropriety. For instance, one corporation
awarded its top executives benefits well in excess of the corpora-
tion's earnings for the year in which the golden parachute contract
was arranged. s Finally, since it is doubtful that many executives
would resign during a takeover and forfeit the prestige and bene-
fits associated with their positions, 3 9 and since, following a take-
134 Since the benefits included in a golden parachute are paid by the acquiring corpora-
tion, those shareholders who retain their status subsequent to a takeover will suffer de-
creased dividends. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 590 (1933) (compensation paid to of-
ficers is deductible from corporate earnings).
'35 The golden parachute must be viewed as an added expense of the tender offer,
something which decreases the premium to be offered to the shareholders. See Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 4, at 1173 (origin of premium is the decrease in agency expenditures).
15' See 2 B. Fox & E. Fox, supra note 1, § 27.02, at 27-14; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 4, at 1165-74; see also 1 M. LnPToN & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 4, § 1.3, at 9 (a
typical target characteristic is undervalued stock). Ideally, management should maintain the
corporation's stock at optimum levels, Cooper, supra note 12, at 68, and thus avoid take-
overs. See WARD HoWELL SuRVEy, supra note 8, at 9.
137 See supra note t and accompanying text; infra note 138 and accompanying text.
23 See GRE Proxy Statement, supra note t, at 9. As of June 8, 1982, Gulf Resources
and Chemical Corporation estimated that its Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer, Robert H. Allen, would be entitled to golden parachute benefits of more than $5.5
million. Brief for Defendant, Exhibit B, Allen v. Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp., No. 82-
27756 (D. Ct. Harris County, Tex.) (Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp. Calculation of Estimated
Benefits Under Severance Benefit Agreements as of June 8, 1982). The total amount of
benefits awarded to employees exceeded $18 million. Id. The corporate earnings from con-
tinuing operations for 1981 totaled $12.6 million. Id. at 13.
Other golden parachutes recently have received much publicity. Several high-level ex-
ecutives at American Brands were guaranteed "[b]ase salary ... for three years," "profit-
sharing, pension and health and related benefits." Cooper, supra note 12, at 66. Celanese
Corporation provides certain of its executives with golden parachutes entailing "[a] sum
equal to annual base salary multiplied by 4 or multiplied by the difference between the
executive's age at that time and 65, whichever is the lesser number," as well as the
"[e]quivalent of pension benefits due whether or not the executive has completed ten years'
service." Id.; see id. at 66-67.
1 9 Cooper, supra note 12, at 66; cf. Herzel & Coling, supra note 41, at 10, coL 3
("Golden parachute agreements, no matter how favorable,. . . [are not] an adequate substi-
tute for highly desirable jobs in which [executives] have invested large parts of their lives").
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over, efficient managers generally obtain employment at similar or
better positions with greater benefits, 40 or are retained by the ac-
quirer at higher compensation rates,"" a golden parachute provi-
sion appears superfluous.
THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
There are several market mechanisms that monitor manage-
ment performance"4 2 such as competition in the product market,143
capital market,' market for managerial services, 45 and market for
corporate control.14 6 It is submitted, however, that while certain of
these mechanisms may protect shareholders from managerial inef-
ficiency, the market for corporate control is the sole mechanism
that guards against self-dealing. 147  Competition in the product
market, for example, provides little constraint in this regard, for it
is dubious to suggest that self-dealing will lead to less success in
the product market. 48  Similarly, the capital market-reflecting
Evidence indicates no tendency on the part of management to leave a corporation during a
takeover battle, since this period would be the most inappropriate time for an executive to
resign. McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 48.
140 R. Lamalie, supra note 57, at 6. Generally, executives who depart after a takeover
fare better than those who leave before. Those executives who have built a successful corpo-
ration are attractive commodities. Id. An effective manager, therefore, should not need the
security of a golden parachute. See Herzel & Colling, supra note 41, at 12, col. 3.
"4 See WARD HowELL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 8.
12 Gilson, supra note 2, at 836-40.
14s The product market is "comprised of a cluster of products or services, within which
one or both of the merging companies operate." 1 B. Fox & E. Fox, supra note 1, § 16.02[1],
at 16-7 (citation omitted); Gilson, supra note 2, at 837.
144 The capital market is evidenced by the "market price of the corporation's stock."
Gilson, supra note 2, at 838. Poor performance in the capital market will result in higher
rates of interest when the corporation attempts to borrow money. Id. at 838 n.73.
145 The market for managerial services involves the "buying" of employees to manage
the corporation. See id. at 837-38. Inefficient management will suffer a lower market value
and therefore be less successful in the managerial market. Id. at 838 n.72.
1,6 The market for corporate control entails the buying of a controlling share of stock in
a corporation. See id. at 841-45. The principle of a corporate control market is that ineffi-
ciency or self-dealing will cause a decrease in corporate profits and a reduction in stock
value, creating "an opportunity for entrepreneurial profit." Id. at 841. Underlying the theory
is the premise that there is "a high positive correlation between corporate managerial effi-
ciency and the market price of shares of that company." Manne, Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965). An acquirer could obtain a high
rate of return by purchasing the corporation at a depressed stock level and substituting
efficient executives for incumbent management. Gilson, supra note 2, at 841-42; Manne,
supra, at 112.
147 Gilson, supra note 2, at 844.
48 Id. at 839.
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the market price of the corporation's shares 14--does not necessa-
rily constrain self-dealing, since stock value will decrease "only to
the extent the corporation cannot finance its activities through re-
tained earnings and debt."' 150 Thus, as long as the corporation has
available cash reserves, the capital market is an ineffective con-
straint.15' Finally, the market for managerial services does not al-
ways constrain management, because the employers of managers
are themselves managers with similar interests in job security.152
The market for corporate control on the other hand, does pro-
tect against self-dealing. Within this market there are four mecha-
nisms by which managerial displacement may be effectuated: the
merger, the sale of assets, the proxy fight, and the tender offer.153
Of these four mechanisms only the tender offer effectively can ac-
complish the desired monitoring function.154 The merger and sale
of assets can be accomplished only if management initially ap-
proves the transaction. Without approval, the issue will not reach
the shareholders.155 Concerning the proxy fight, the return on a
shareholder's investment is generally too minimal to make such a
challenge profitable. 56 The challenger in a proxy fight must use
personal funds, whereas management may resist the challenge with
corporate resources. 57 Thus, unless a challenger owns a substantial
number of shares, a proxy fight is not a worthwhile or realistic
venture.1
58
149 Id. at 838.
190 Id. at 839 (footnote omitted).
151 Id.
152 Id.; see M. MACE, supra note 86, at 163-69; Mace, Directors: Myth and Real-
ity-Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 293, 296 (1979).
1"3 Gilson, supra note 2, at 842; see Manne, supra note 146, at 114-19.
154 Gilson, supra note 2, at 844; see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1168-74.
' Gilson, supra note 2, at 843. Management control over both mergers and sales of
assets essentially preempts any possibility of market mechanisms effectively monitoring
managers. See id.; Manne, supra note 146, at 117-18. Mergers and sales of assets are unique
in that, "[g]enerally speaking, managers' incentives and interests coincide with those of
their shareholders in every particular except one: they do not have incentive, as managers,
to buy management services for the company at the lowest possible price." Manne, supra
note 146, at 117 (footnote omitted). It is doubtful that management will ever disinterestedly
recommend a change in control. See id. at 118.
199 Gilson, supra note 2, at 843.
Id.; Manne, supra note 146, at 114-15.
199 A shareholder who challenges management in a proxy fight will not be reimbursed
for his efforts unless he succeeds, and unless he possesses a sufficient amount of shares the
return on his investment will be too small to make such a challenge profitable. See Clark,
Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. REs. 776, 783-84 (1979); Gilson, supra note 2,
at 843.
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Since the tender offer is the only adequate monitor of manage-
rial self-dealing, management control over this mechanism appears
inappropriate. 159 Courts, however, generally have held that man-
agement is required to oppose a tender offer that it considers ad-
verse to the shareholders' interests. 160 Purportedly in furtherance
of this mandate, management has promulgated golden
parachutes. 6' Such provisions, it is submitted, reduce the poten-
tial for management displacement and ensure incumbent target
management a buffer against the economic forces that presumably
monitor its actions. 62 Although it is stated that shareholders, as
corporate owners, assume the risks of doing business, 63 this as-
sumption is not absolute, because shareholders cannot be expected
to acquiesce in management self-dealing. Because management
"can be expected, if otherwise unconstrained, to maximize its own
welfare rather than the shareholders',"" it is essential to maintain
the one effective constraint on management's activities-the mar-
ket for corporate control in the context of the tender offer. 65 To
condone the use of golden parachutes is to provide executives with
almost absolute insulation from the effects of economic forces and
" Gilson, supra note 2, at 844; see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1174-80; cf.
Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 4, at 436-37 (management domination over the board ren-
ders "nonexamination, business judgment approach in hostile tender offer cases inappropri-
ate"). Management discretion to employ defensive tactics to avert a tender offer lessens the
effectiveness of such offers as constraints upon management, since transaction costs will be
increased and the incentive to initiate a tender offer will decrease. Gilson, supra note 2, at
845; see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1174-80. ?
"' See, e.g., Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D.
Ill. 1969). In Northwest, the court stated that, under New York law, a decision by manage-
ment to oppose an offer must be made impartially and in good faith. Id.; see Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 4, at 1173; see also Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors
Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 CORP. L. REv. 107, 109-12 (1980) (resistance to
tender offers may be beneficial to shareholders).
1"1 See Cooper, supra note 12, at 66; Klein, supra note 41, at 56, col. 1. Proponents of
golden parachutes assert that the contracts are necessary to "ensure that acquisition or
merger proposals that do come along will be weighed dispassionately by the people in charge
." Klein, supra note 41, at 56, col. 1.
162 See WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 2.
163 See Utility Trailer Mfg. Co. v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 773, 784 (S.D. Cal. 1962);
Security Fin. & Loan Co. v. Koehler, 210 F. Supp. 603, 606 (D. Kan. 1962). As owners of the
corporation, stockholders invest "in the corporate venture and [take] the risk of loss in or-
der to share in the profit. . .." 210 F. Supp. at 606.
164 Gilson, supra note 2, at 840; see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1170. Un-
doubtedly, some managers "will find it advantageous to shirk responsibilities, consume per-
quisites, or otherwise take more than the corporation promised to give them." Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 4, at 1170.
165 See Gilson, supra note 2, at 836-40.
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to emasculate the most effective means by which shareholders may
exercise their rights of ownership.16
CONCLUSION
It is ironic that the judicial permissiveness of the business
judgment rule,1 6 7 founded upon principles of laissez faire6 8 and the
belief that economic forces will compel management to act both
efficiently and in the shareholders' best interests, 69 is used to
shield management from the economic forces that monitor it.17 0 It
is unsettling also that this distortion of the theory of economic in-
centives171 may be carried over into the context of the golden para-
16 Cf. West v. Camden, 135 U.S. 507 (1890) (contract to keep an officer permanently in
his position is void). Several observations are appropriate. If a golden parachute is designed
to ensure management objectivity and continuity so they confidently can resist a takeover,
see WARD HOWELL SuRVEy, supra note 8, at 1, such a contract, in the event a takeover
occurs, pays for a job poorly done. If the intent is to attract and retain good management,
see Morrison, supra note 37, at 83, the golden parachute nonetheless permits good manage-
ment to leave following a takeover. Because the target company frequently is inefficiently
managed, the golden parachute insulates poor managers from their own ineffectiveness.
The ultimate effect is to infringe on the shareholder's right of ownership, and to insulate
management from the most effective monitor of its conduct-the market for corporate con-
trol. The market for corporate control provides "shareholders both power and protection
commensurate with their interest in corporate affairs." Manne, supra note 146, at 112; see
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1168-74.
187 Editorial Note, supra note 102, at 568. Judicial permissiveness encourages initiative
by permitting a director, acting in good faith, broad discretion in the management of corpo-
rate affairs, without fear of liability in the event his personal interests conflict with the
corporation's. Id. Rarely is a director subjected to liability in the absence of a clear showing
of fraud. The logic of such judicial restraint is that directors are involved in a complex and
uncertain business, and the courts are ill-equipped to substitute their judgment for the
board's. See J. LOUDEN, THE DIRECTOR 21 (3d ed. 1982); Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of
the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 399, 421-22 (1962).
188 Note, supra note 74, at 600; Editorial Note, supra note 102, at 565. The theory that
human motives should be permitted to influence the economy without restraint was basic to
the laissez-faire philosophy of the nineteenth century. Editorial Note, supra note 102, at
565.
18, See Editorial Note, supra note 102, at 570-71. The need for economic incentive
arises from the characteristic separation of ownership and control in the modem, publicly
held corporation. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1170. Modern corporate man-
agers generally do not possess a recognizable proprietary interest in the corporation and,
since they do not reap the full benefits of their labor, often are less than diligent in oversee-
ing corporate affairs. See id. at 1170; Manne, supra note 146, at 113; Editorial Note, supra
note 102, at 113.
170 See Gilson, supra note 2, at 822; Editorial Note, supra note 102, at 564. The busi-
ness judgment rule "reflects a conclusion that the management action in question will not
be reviewed at all." Giison, supra note 2, at 822 (footnote omitted); Editorial Note, supra
note 102, at 564.
171 By ensuring that management is insulated from the adverse consequences of a take-
GOLDEN PARACHUTE AGREEMENTS
chute.7 2 As stated by one commentator, "[t]o the extent that the
business judgment rule presupposes effective nonlegal constraints
on management decisions, it is inconsistent with management con-
trol over tender offers. 1 73
Joseph F. Haggerty
over, the golden parachute clause frustrates the theory of economic incentives:
[T]he greatest benefits of the takeover scheme probably inure to those least con-
scious of it. Apart from the stock market, we have no objective standard of mana-
gerial efficiency. Courts, as indicated by the so-called business judgment rule, are
loath to second-guess business decisions or remove directors from office. Only the
take-over scheme provides some assurance of competitive efficiency among corpo-
rate managers and thereby affords strong protection to the interests of vast num-
bers of small, non-controlling shareholders.
Manne, supra note 146, at 113. Although numerous commentators have argued in favor of
defensive tactics, see, e.g., Lipton, supra note 22, at 106-12, it is suggested that they have
overlooked the critical role played by the market for corporate control, see Smiley, Do
Tender Offers Damage Stockholders, reprinted in THE ATrAcK ON COPORATE AmERiCA 97,
99-101 (M. Johnson ed. 1978).
172 See WARD HOWELL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 8; Fleischer & Raymond, supra note 17,
at 27, col. 1; Klein, supra note 41, at 56, col. 3. Commentators have postulated that judicial
scrutiny of golden parachutes will be guided by the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Klein,
supra note 41, at 56, col. 3.
172 Gilson, supra note 2, at 844 (footnote omitted); see Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note
4, at 436-37.
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